By Muhammad Khalid Noori
Censorship is not only the suppression of speech, public communication, or other kinds of expression or information that is considered objectionable for political, moral or religious reasons by the government or state authorities. Censorship occurs whenever people, institutions or organizations succeed in imposing their political or moral values or particular interests on others by suppressing the circulation of certain words, images, or ideas that they find offensive or otherwise objectionable.
The basic situation of censorship is that some third party, the censor, interferes with an ongoing, attempted or desired communication between people. One example is postal censorship. The censor tries to prevent or limit the recipient’s access to a particular kind of expression, either by deterring the speaker from speaking or the hearer or reader from receiving such speech.
The most effective way to do the latter is to prevent or restrict the production, distribution or circulation of copies of the expression deemed objectionable. If the stuff regarded as dangerous cannot be eliminated altogether, the censor might try to control and restrict the potential recipient’s access to such copies.
Censorship is a deeply ambivalent issue. It was considered indispensable in most literate societies that we know of, from the Hebrew Bible or Ancient China to large parts of 20th century Europe, and continues to thrive throughout the world. However, since the European enlightenment, censorship has, for good largely fallen into disrepute. Censorship by government authorities – or at least the law that required government approval prior to printed publications – was abolished in Sweden as early as 1766 and prohibited in the United States of America in 1791 by the first amendment to the constitution. The abolishment of censorship and the protection of the freedom of speech were sooner or later adopted by most modern constitutions – at least by the letter of the law.
Even if there is ample reason not to be satisfied with the existing censorship policies in many countries, it does make a difference whether governments and courts are bound by official proclamations that prohibit censorship, or whether it is explicitly acknowledged as constitutional.
The negative impact of censorship is undeniable. Censorship stifles self-expression and thus an essential part of human flourishing. It suppresses people’s ability to make up their minds, voice protest and, if need be, to organize resistance. Moreover, those who find it necessary to silence the voices of opposition are, in many cases, not content with stopping the circulation of copies of newspapers, books and pamphlets, or with interrupting the operation of media infrastructures. They also intimidate writers or journalists, disrupt their careers, and force them to go into exile, imprison or even injure them for speaking their opinion.
This is abominable and unacceptable in every single case. But the harm inflicted by censorship is not limited to the people who are silenced. It concerns also, or even primarily, those who cannot hear what they might want to. With censorship, everybody is deprived of numerous opportunities for relevant insights and stimulating debates that might benefit our personal and communal development.
Censorship interferes with people’s right to make their own choices and form their own opinions. This is negative for the people affected by the restrictions of a censorship regime, but also for society as a whole. If relevant information about certain matters is suppressed and withheld from the public, people are misled and deceived. They will make bad choices and fall headlong towards ruin. People can, of course, also be misled and deceived by fake news and disinformation, in particular if it is broadly disseminated on numerous influential media channels.
A plurality of opinions concerning controversial questions can, of course, be a symptom or source of social divisions. Nonetheless, we should regard diverging opinions as inherently valuable, because even false views contribute to deepening our understanding of the relevant matter, and eventually of the truth, as many scholars has argued.
If controversial opinions are silenced, the truth might be lost and prevailing falsehoods may remain unquestioned. If criticism is stifled, everybody’s chances to find out the truth will be diminished. These are classic and undeniably relevant arguments. But what follows from these arguments for our present debate about the regulation of public communication in our emerging hyper connected digital media environment? Are there cases where the damage inflicted on people, or on society at large, due to the public circulation and accessibility of certain kinds of images, signs or speech actually outweighs the harm done by censorship? Can the harm done by people who feel encouraged to commit felonies or to riot because of the hateful or demeaning messages they have been received justify censorship? Even more would agree that we are morally obliged to do our best to reduce such harm, as long as the prevention does not cause even greater harm.
Thus, if we agree that the circulation and distribution of copies of certain kinds of images, signs, words or speech acts can indeed cause severe harm – more severe than the harm caused by censorship –, we might have to admit, at least in a consequentialist framework, that there is, indeed, a moral need for censorship and the corresponding surveillance and access restrictions.But what exactly should be censored, and what should remain uncensored under any circumstances? How should censorship decisions be made and implemented? What are the relevant criteria, or, what should they be? And how can conflicts about censorship criteria be decided? Who should have a right to demand censorship? Who should decide about such requests? What qualifications should be required of persons entrusted with censorship tasks? Should it be possible to appeal against censorship decisions? Who should the censors be accountable to?
These questions are at the heart of the ongoing controversies about censorship and the freedom of speech. There will be no easy, universally acceptable answer. These are crucial political issues. Deciding these questions – and accepting, rejecting or challenging those decisions – is constitutive for the society we live in. We do not have to make up the rules concerning censorship and the freedom of expression from scratch, and we are not in a position to. We are living under such rules and are trying to figure out whether they must be revised and how they might be improved.
There can be little doubt that they need careful, critical revision in order to adjust them to the ongoing development of our society and culture, to the conflicts that upset or engage us, and to our rapidly changing media technologies. Wherever we are going to draw the lines, we have to acknowledge the necessity to strike a balance between the greatest possible freedom of opinion and artistic expression, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, security concerns, economic interests, the protection of privacy and other personality rights, as well as the indispensable requirements for social coexistence
